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STATEMENT OF THE CASfc 
This is an action to recover ^hild support 
under the Utah Public Enforcement of Support Act, Utah 
Code Annotated Title 78, Chapter 4r>b. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COllfRT 
On December 13, 1983* a Notice of Support Debt 
was sent to the appellant. Appellant dud not answer this 
Notice. Op March 6, 1984* a default aw^rd for $724 was 
entered against the appellant in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for San Juan County. On (April 23, 1984, 
a writ ot garnishment was issued by the (Deputy Clerk of 
the District Court. On May 21, 1984> apjpellant filed a 
Notice ot Special Appearance, a Motion t|o Vacate Judgment, 
and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. On June 4, 
appellant filed a Motion to Quash the wrpLt of garnishment, 
based upon the prior Memorandum of Point^s and Authorities. 
On June 15, 1984, the District Judge issued a ruLmg 
denying the Motion to Vacate. No separate ruling on the 
Motion to Quash has been made. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAR 
Appellant seeks reversal of th^ District Court 
ruling denying the Motion to Vacate, and an order direct-
ing the District Court to vacate the judgment, quash the 
writ of garnishment, and dismiss the action for want of 
////// -1-
of subject matter aid personal jurisdiction, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is an e rolled member of the Navajo 
Tribe of Indians. He is a resident of Aneth, Utah, within 
the exterior boundaries of th<* Navajo Reservation, Apel-
lant has resided at Aneth continuously since .19 75. 
Appellant1** ex-wife, Helen Vijii is an enrolled 
member of the Navajo Tribe. All of the appellant's 
children are enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe. Prior 
to their divorce, Helen and Daniel Vijil and cheir 
children resided at Aneth, upon the Navajo Reservation. 
On March 10, 1975 appellant and Helen Vijil were 
divorced pursuant to a decree of the Tuba Cit/ District 
Court of the Navajo Nation. This decree established 
Daniel Vijil's duty to pay child support. 
Some t tine after the divorce, Helen Vijil moved 
away from the Navajo Reservation to Blanding» Utah* taking 
her children, While in Blanding rhe began receiving 
payments of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The 
recovery of those payments, premised upon Daniel Vijilfs 
duty under the Tribal Court decree, is the basis of the 
present action. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1* The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over an action for child support between enrolled 
members of the Navajo Tribe, one of whom Is domiciled 
on the Navajo Reservation, as a matter of Federal Jaw, 
2* The District Court lacked pergonal jurisdiction uver a 
Navajo resident of the Navajo Reservation who nas no 
significant contacts with the State of Utah, as a 
matter of Federal la\vr. 
ARGUMENT 
1, THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS SIlBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION FOR CHILD 
SUPPORT BETWEEN ENROLLED MEMBERS OF THE 
NAVAJO TRIBE OF WHOM ONE IS DOMICILED 
ON THE NAVAJO RESERVATION\ 
The iules concerning the scop^ of state juris-
diction over Indian lands have had a long development, 
beginning \n 1831, Tn that year, the Supreme Court of the 
United States issued a decision in Chercjkee Nation v. 
Georgia (18i"»), 30 U.S. (5 Pet*) 1, 8 L.Ed. 25, which 
concerned a Cherokee application for an injunction against 
the State of Georgid. to restrain execution of state laws 
on Indian land. The requested relief wals denied, but the 
Court established the principle tint Indian Tribes are 
dependent domtstic nations; not fd eign states, but 
nonetheless sovereignties separate from |the United States. 
-3-
This concept was extendtd by the Court in 
Worcester v. Georgia (1832), 31 1, . 3. (6 Pet.) 5Jr>f 8 L.Ed. 
483. In that case, a citizen of Vermont was condemn*-a for 
violation oi a Georgia law within Cherokee territory. The 
Court reversed this conviction, holding that the Cherokee 
nation wae a distinct sovereignty witnan whose territory 
the laws of Georgia could have no force* The rationale 
for the holding is one of preemption: treaties between the 
United State?- and the CI emkee nation ft * . . recognize til** 
pre-existing puwer of the nation to govern jtteli . .If 
thus precluding the 1 iws of Georgia from having any force 
or effect within Cherokee territory. (Id» at p.582.) 
Preemption analysis has subsequently been applied 
in matter of both cn/Jl and etiminal jurisdiction. In 
Talton v. Mayes (189b J
 3 163 h.S. 376, lft S.Ct. 98of 41 
L.£d. 19 6, the Supreme Court held that a criir*. commit tea 
by an Indian within Cherokee territory could rot be pro-
secuted by the United States, as the right to define ard 
prosecute criminal behavior was an aspect of overeignty 
guaranteed to the Cherokee Tribe t»\ treaty, ho re lecentlv, 
1 n
 United States v. Wheeler (19/8), 43 5 U . !>. I> 1 J , ^8 S.Ct. 
1079, :>5 L.Ed.2d 393, the Court determined that a Navajo 
Indian could be punished for the same criminal act by 
both the U.S. and the Navajo Tribe wif~houf violating the 
guarantee against Double Jeopardy. This result is reached 
////// 
by deeming the Tribe to be an independent sovereign and 
applying the so-called separate sovereigns exception to 
Double Jeopardy. The rule stated by th|e Court is that 
Indian tribes retain all power of sovereignty not with-
drawn by treaty or federal statute. Th|e Navajo Tribe is 
a limited sovereignty wxth certain inherent powers which 
were never extinguished. This n..*righlt of internal self-
government includes the right to prescribe laws applicable 
to tribal members and enforce them by criminal sanctions*11 
(Id, at p.322.) 
Thus, in the area of criminal law, states are 
preempted from asserting criminal jurisdiction over Indians 
on reservation lands, as sovereignty ov^r criminal matters 
involving Indians is guaranteed to the tribes by the 
United States* 
Three levels of analysis have been used in the 
determination and limitation of state cjvil jurisdiction 
ovt-r Indian lands; preemption^ sovereignty infringement, 
an^ substantial contacts* Part TI of tl^ is Memorandum 
discusses the last of these analytical devices, 
fhe .sovereignty infringement 4na^ys*s w a s deve-
loped by the Supreme Court in Wil 1 jams vj. Lee (1959), 
358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L„Ed.2d 251. The Court 
examined the case of an non-Indian tradejr living within 
the Navajo Reservation who attempted to |sue a Navajo in the 
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Arizona courts for a debt incurred upon the Reservation. 
The existence of tribal courts capable of hearing the con-
troversy was noted. (Ijd. , at p. 222.) The Court reviewed 
the history of Indian law, and concluded that in deter-
mining the propriety of state exercise of jurisdiction 
11
. ..absent governing acts of 
Congress, the question has 
always been whether the state 
action infringed on the right 
of Indians to make their own 
laws and be ruled bv them.11 
(id., at p.220 ) Because the Navajo Tribal Courts did 
offer a forum for the dispute, the Supreme Court held the 
exercise oi jurisdiction by Arizona to be invalid as 
"lt]here can be no doubt that to 
allow the exercise of state juris-
diction .. .would undermine the 
authority of the tribal courts 
over Reservation affairs and hence 
would infringe on the rights of 
the Indians to govern themselves." 
(Ld., at p.223) 
^^
e
 Williams decision leaves the status of pre-
emption analysis unsettled. The sovereignty infringement 
test is clearly an alternative method of analysis when no 
"governing artu of Congress" are present which would 
automatically preempt an} eAercise of jurisdiction by a 
state. However, the Court does not specify any other 
facts triggering the use of one form of analysis over the 
other. 
_6-
Some attempt to clarity the precise application 
of ench test was made in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commissioner (1973), 411 U.S. 164* 93 ^.Ct. 1257, 36 L,Ed. 
2d 129. The issue raised was whether imposition of state 
income tax upon reservation Indians was| an infringement of 
tribal sovereignty. The Court 1a opinion reviews the bibtory 
of Indian law cases and notes the right) of self-government. 
The Court explains that two tests had bjeen developed to 
determine the limits of state jurisdiction over tribal 
a) fairs: the sovereignty-infringement ajnalysis of Williams 
and the preemption approach oi Worees*"e|r. 
The Court rejects the contention that the 
sovereignty infringement test should apjply to th* facts 
°* McC I anahan. 
H
...[C]ases applying the Williams 
test have dealt principally with 
situations involving non-Indians. 
[Citations*] In these situations, 
both the tribe and the State could 
fairly claim an interest in assert-
ing their respective jurisdictions. 
The Williams test was designed to 
resolve this conflict by providing 
fhat the State could protect its 
interest up to the point where 
tribal self-government would be 
affected." 
(JL4 * » a t P'179.) Instead, when a case involves the rights 
of Indiaas only, such "•••activity is wlliolly within tbe 
sphere which the reie\aiit treaty and bt&tutes leave fur 
the lederai government and for the Indians themselves*.,.11 
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(JLfi* * a t Pn* 179-180), and preemption analysis, rather than 
infringement, must be applied. 
The Court's preemption analysis in McClanahan 
focuses on three federal enactment £*: the rrcaty of 186b 
between the Navajo Tribe and the United States, the 
Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat. 557, 569) and 25 U.S.C. 
§§1321-1)26. With regard to the 1868 Treaty* the Court 
notes that it does rot expressly exclude state civil 
jurisdiction, but that 
"...it cannot be doujted that the 
reservation of certain lands for 
the exclusive use and occupancy 
of the Navajos and the exclusion 
oi non-Navajos from the prescribed 
area was meant to establish the 
lands as within the exclusive 
sovereignty of the Navajos under 
general federal supervision. Lt 
is thus unsurprising that this 
Court has interpreted the Navajo 
treaty to preclude extension of 
state law - including state tax 
law - to Indians on the Navajo 
Reservation." [Citations.] 
(Iji. » at p. 174-175.) 
The opinion cites the Arizona Enabling Act as 
conditioning Arizona's entry into the Union upon ai. express 
disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands within its 
boundaries* (-»J»* at p. 175) Congress has also established 
an exclusive method by which states, such as Arizona, mav 
acquire civil jurisdiction over Jnlian lands. This method 
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is detailed at Title 25, sections 1 321-fJ 326 of the United 
States Code, The Court notes that Arizona has not complied 
with the statutory requirements of the ICode to acquire 
such jurisdiction, and in the absence 0f statutory com-
I 
pliance Arizona can exercise neither criminal or civil 
jurisdiction over the Navajo Reservat io|n. (lj|*» a t PP • 
178-180,) 
Thus, without considering infringement of Navajo 
sovereignty, the (lourt held that Arizonb lacked all juris-
diction over Navajo lands and people, flhc state income 
taA on Navajos was struck down, 
A certain degree of vagueness re-entered the 
analytical methodology of the Court fn fisher v. District 
Court (1976), 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 94$, 47 L.Ed.2d 106. 
Ihe case concerns the extent of state cd>uit jurisdiction 
over the adoption of a Northern Cheyenncjt child by members 
ot the same tribe. The adoption was contested by the 
natuial mother, also a member of the Noilthern Cheyenne, 
who moved to dismiss the state court actjion for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court begins its analysts |by stating the 
test to be applied. 
'In litigation between Indians 
and non-Indians arising out of 
conduct on an Indian Reservation, 
resolution of conflicts between 
the -jurisdiction of state ^nd 
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tribal courts has depended, absent 
a governing Act of Congress, on 
"whether the state action infringed 
on the right of reservation Indians 
to make their own laws and be ruled 
by them.,,f [Citations.] Since this 
litigation involves only Indians, 
at least the same standard must be 
met before the state courts may 
exercised jurisdiction. [Citations.] 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
(1A* » n t P-386.) The Court applied this test and reached 
the conclusion that the Montana court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over the adjudication. The court held that 
fl[s]tate-court jurisdiction plainly 
would interfere with the powers of 
self-government conferred upon the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe and exercised 
through the Tribal Court. It would 
subject a dispute arising on the 
reservation among reservation Indians 
to a forum other than the one they 
have established for themselves* As 
the present record illustrates, it 
would create a substantial risk of 
conflicting adjudications effect ing 
the custody of the child and would 
cause a corresponding decline in 
the Authority of the Tribal Court." 
(id., at pp.387-388.) 
Although not employed as the primary basis of 
analysis for the decision, the preemption test is given 
brief mention by the Court. 
"No federal statute sanctions this 
interference with tribal self-
government. Montana has not been 
granted, nor has it assumed, civil 
jurisdiction over the Northern 
Cheyenne Indian Reservation, either 
under the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 
////// -to-
(Ibid.) 
67 Stat C)8S9 or under Title IV 
of the Civil Rights Act bf 1968, 
82 Stat 78, 25 USC §§1321 et seq 
[25 USCS §§1321 et seq.] 
After Fisher tne e x K t precedence of the twe 
analytical methods JLL unclear* i ai i in^emer t analysis is a 
minimum requirement when Indians are tl(ie only parties to an 
action over which a state attempts tn Assert jurisdiction. 
However, the preemption analysis ot Mc^lanahan is not over-
ruled in Fisher• Both tests may be us^l by a court, but if 
the case involves only Indians* and an analysis of relevant 
treaties and statutes shows state jurisdiction to be pre-
empted, then the analysis is complete $nd state jurisdiction 
is precluded absolutely* sovereignty Infringement aeeo 
only be examined if no preemption is friund, or the action 
involves non-Indians. 
Courts from several states b4ve recently b ^ en 
called upon te apply these tests in ehijid support and 
paternity ca<es. In State ex rel. Flammond v. Flammond 
(1980), Mon^ . , 621 P.^d 4 7 i (and tiie companion opinion of 
$ t ate ex rel. 1 h r e e. Irons jv^ Three Irorijs (19^0), Mont . , 
621 P * 2*1 476)* the Montana Supreme Courjt examined the 
jurisdiction of the state in a Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support action brought in state) court by a member 
ot the BJackfeet Tribe, joined by Los Amgeles County (from 
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whom the plaintiff had received welfare), against another 
member of the Blackfeet Tribe domiciled on the Tribe's 
Montana reservation, Employing preemption analysis, the 
tourt concluded that Montana lacked civil jurisdiction 
over Indian reservations within the state as it had not 
complied with the statutory requirements of 25 (J. S . C. 
§§1321-1326, and the action was dismissed. (j_jd ,, at p. 472.) 
Arizona rerognizeci the limitations on its 
authority aftei Mc_cj_l_an^ haa in Francisco v. Stale of Arizona 
(1976), Ariz,, 536 P.2d 1. The issue before the Arizona 
Supreme Court was the validity of service ox process bv a 
county sheriff upon an enrolled member of the Papago Tribe-
domiciled on the Tribe's reservation. The Court applied 
the preemption analysis of KcCI anaban« The Executive Order 
establishing tiie Reservation, the Arizona Enabling Act, and 
the state's failure to comply with 25 U.S.f. gg 1321-1326* 
all dictated the conclusion that Arizona lacked civil 
jutisdtot ion ovei the Reservation* As service of state 
civil process by a county sheriff acting in his official 
eapaeitv constitutes an exercise of state civil authority, 
such reivue uus deemed preempted and therefore invalid. 
*±Lte» ^auneica v. Campbell ( L 9 7 4) , 2 2 Ariz. App. 287, 526 
P.2d 1085 [Arizona lacks cavil and criminal jurisdiction 
as matter of lederai preemption pursuant to McClanahan and 
Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act cannot be 
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applied to Indian drives on Navajo Reservation.!). 
Subsequently, A.iJzona extended this rule in a 
consideration of state civil jurisdiction in a IIRESA action 
brouglit by one member of the Papago Tribe against a second 
member djiniciled on the lribe*s reservation. In Ncnnaj v._ 
Moieno (1982), 132 Ariz. 5bt>, 647 P.2d 1183, the Arizona 
Court or Appeal held that Arizona lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction ovar the reservation for s|uch actions as it 
had not complied with the requirements |of 25 U.S.C. 
§§1321~J32t>. 
Certain summary conclusions ckn be drawn as to 
each analytical method. Sovereignty infringement is 
utilized, as a minimum requirement, wheii all parties to 
an action are Indian [f isher v. D i s t r i c j Court, supra, 
42i U.S. 382] , or in any case where the adverse parties 
are Indians and non-Indians [ M c C _1_ a n ajh a^n _ i y ._ Ari z o n a State 
Tax _C o mmi s_ s i oner , sup r a , 411 U.S. i 6 4 j . The transaction, 
ev^nt5 or status which is the biibject maltter of the 
action has its location within Indian te|rritory [Williams 
v ie e , supra , 358 U.S. 217; fisher v. Dlistrict Court, 
supra; State ex rel Flammond v. Flammondj, supra, 621 P. 2 d 
47JJ, The basis for the assertion of sta|te authority 
derives from the involvement of non-Indians as parties 
[McClanahan , supra] . The focus of the analysis is upon 
tribal law^ and institutions, and the potential, conflict 
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and corrosive effect which the assertion of st^te juris-
diction voulu have upon such laws and institutions 
I £.111 LlSJLJiil!_L? i~* JETE2LS.» FJr§1\er v »_,,PJ..str J-Ct: Court
 9 supra ; 
S.ee_
 f R.J, Williams Go, v. Fort Belknap Housing Authori ty_ 
(1983, 9th Gir.)* /19 F.2d 979, 983 ("A tribe S, interest 
in j>el f -govern-nen t could be implicated in two ways. First, 
it a state or federal court resolves a dispute which was 
within tne province of the tribal courts..., that court 
would impinge upon the tribe's right to adjudicate con-
troversies arising within it, [Citations*] Sacond, if 
the dispute itseli calls into question the validity ox 
propriety of an act fairly attributable to the tribe as 
a governmental body, tribal self-government is drawn 
directly into ihe controversy. [Citdtion.]fPar.J We 
have recognized that the tribal court is generally the 
exclusive foium for the adjudication of disputes affecting 
the interest o£ both Indians and nor-Indiana which arise 
on the reservation [Citations.] ,") ; State of Arizona 
ex rel, Merrill v, lurtie (1969), 4J J F.id 68} (Navajo 
Tribal law provided nn extradition procedure, therefore 
Oklahoma's failure to iomply with this pjoced' rt was 
invalidated as an infringement upon Tribal sovereignty.)]* 
Preemption analysis is employed whenever the 
only rights legitimalely at issue in the action beloag to 
Indians alone [McCl anahan v , Ar i z cma ...State _ Ta.<_ CoiainjLs^ ij_nejr, 
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gjipra] , Neither a state's interest in taxing Indians 
residing within its borders and possibly consuming state 
services, nor the payment of wclfaie by a state agency, 
have been consideied legitimate nort-Iniiian interests ade-
quate to circumvent preemption of statt jurisdiction by 
federal enactments, in such cases, this analytical method 
must be used prior to any consideration of sovereignty 
infringement. If preoption is found, infringement is 
irrelevant, and the state exeicise of jurisdiction is 
barred. The transaction, event , or status which is the 
subject matter of the action is located] upon the Indian 
reservation* The analysis tocuses uponj treaties between 
the United States and the tribe, and uppn other relevant 
Congressional enactments precluding stalte jurisdiction 
over tribal affair^* No interest which the state may 
claim it* permitted to overcome pieemptibn and allow juris-
d i e t i o n * 
P r e e m p t i o n a n a l y s i s must he applied in the 
prese n t c a s e , H e l e n Vijil is an e n r o l l e d m e m b e r uf the 
N a v a j o T r i b e , T h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n of H e l e n and Daniel V i j i l 
are e n r o l l e d m e m b e r b of the N a v a j o T r i b ^ * Daniel Vijil is 
an e n r o l l e d m e m b e r of the N a v a j o T r i b e $.nd is a d o m i c i l i a r y 
of the Navajo Reservation, The children were born upon the 
Reservation and Mr, Viji 1 *s obligation to support them 
originates there, Helen and Daniel weiel divorced by the 
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N a v a j o T r i b a l C o u r t , whose D t c r e e of D i v o r c e p r o v i d e s 
t h e s u p p o r t o r d e r w h i c h i s t h e b a s i s of t h e p r e c e p t d e b t 
o b l i g a t i o n * 
The S t a i o f 3 i n t e r e s t m t h e a c t i o n i s i n c i d e n t a l . 
i t s r i g h t t o r e c o v e r f o r AFDC e x p e n d i t u r e s i s p r e m i s e d 
upon a d e f e n d a n t f a t h e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n t o pay c h i l d s u p p o r t 
and a m o t h e r ' s r i g h t t o c n i o r c c t h a t o b l i g a t i o n * Toe 
AFDC a r r a n g e m e n t l e a v e s t h e r i g h t of t h e m o t h e r s u b r o g a t e d 
t o t h e s t a t e . But t h e s t a t e h a s no r i g h t s i n d e p e n d e n t of 
! 
t h e m o t h e r 1 5 * . The S t a t e of U tah i s i n a p o s i t i o n j i n i l a r 
t o c h a t of A r . 2 o n j in McC3 a n a l o g : t h e m e r e c o n s u m p t i o n o f 
s t a t e r e s o u r c e s d o e e no t e l e v a t e t h e i e g i l s t a t u s of t h e 
s t a t e s u f f i c i e n t l y t o n a k e e i t h e r r u a t i o n o r AFDC *"£»-
t e v e r y a c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n I n d i a n s c*nd n o n - t n o j a n s . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y t h i s I s an a c t i o n w h e r e t h e o n l y l e g i t i m a t e l y 
a s se r t t a b l e r i g h t s a t i s p n o a r e t h o s e of I n d i a a r . I h o s e 
I r d i a n r i g f t t a a r e l o c a t e d upon t h e ISiavajo R e s e r v a t i o n , and 
p r e e m p t i o n -analys t -* i b r e q u i r e d , 
The Utah Publ ic Support of Chi ldren Act s t a t e s , a t U.C.A. 73~45b-3{l) : 
" In the event t h a t a s s i s t a n c e i s furnished by the department or in 
i n s t a n c e s where the department has con t r ac t ed to c o l l e c t suppor t , the 
department s h a l l become t r u s t e e s of any cause of a c t i o n of the ob l igee 
or any minor c h i l d in t h a t o b l i g e e ' s cus tody, to recover support due 
to t h a t ob l igee from any person and may br ing and mainta in the a c t i o n 
e i t h e r in i t s own name or in the name of the obl igee . 1 1 
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McCJanahan controls disposition cf this appeal. 
The 1868 Treaty lb deemed to grant the Navajo Tribe ex-
clusive jurisdiction over its lands, fhe Utah Enabling 
Act disclaims any jurisdiction over Indian lands in Utah, 
stating at Section fhree, in pertinent parts 
M[t]hat the people inhabiting said 
proposed State do agree that they 
forever disclaim all right and title 
to the unappropriated public lands 
within the boundaries the 
to all lands lying within 
owned or held by any Indi 
tribes; and that until th 
thereto shall have been e 
by the United States, the 
be and remain subject to 
tion of the United States 
Indian lands shall remain 
absolute jurisdiction and 
the Congress of the Unite 
reof; and 
said limits 
an or Indian 
e title 
xtinguished 
same shall 
the disposi-
, and said 
under the 
control of 
d States•. .*f 
The e f f e c t of 25 U . S . C . s e c t i o n s 1 3 2 1 - 1 3 2 6 
p r e s e n t s a sowewhaf more c o m p l i c a t e d p r o b l e m t h a n e x i t e d 
In A r i z o n a when M c C l a n a h a n was d e c i d e d . U tah Code A n n o -
t a t e d s e c t i o n s 63~~36~9 and 6 3 - 3 6 - 1 3 p u r p o r t t o e x t e n d t h e 
c i v i l j u r i s d i c t i o n of U tah t o I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n l a n d s 
w i t h i n U t a h and t o c o n t r o v e r s i e s be twee r i I n d i a n s . T h e s e 
s t a t u t e s w e r e e n a c t e d i n 1 9 7 1 , a p p a r e n t l y i n an a t t e m p t t o 
comply w i t h 25 U . S . C . § § 1 3 2 1 - 1 3 2 6 . However t h e s e s e c t i o n s 
a r e i n e f f e c t i v e t o a c t u a l l y c r e a t e such j u r i s d i c t i o n i n 
t h e S t a t e . 
c
^ the McClanahan Court no tes as being i n d e n t i c a l in language to 
Ar i zona ' s Enabling Act . McClanahan y . Arizona js tate Commissioner, 
supra , 411 U.S. a t p*175, n . 1 4 . 
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The United States Code at Title 25, section 1326 
dec iares 
nls]tate jurisdiction acquired 
pursuant to this title [25 U . S . C . 
§§1321 et seq.] with respect to 
criminal offenses or civil causes 
of action, or with respect to both, 
shall be applicable in Indian Country 
only where the enrolled Indians with-
in the effected area of such Indian 
country accept such jurisdiction by 
a majority vote of the adult Indians 
voting at a special election helci 
for that purpose. The Secretary of 
the Interior shall call such special 
election under such rules and regu-
lation as he may prescribe, when 
requested to do so by the Tribal 
council or other governing body, or 
by 20 per centum of such enrolled 
adults.11 (Emphasis supplied.) 
This statute was enacted by Congress in 19 68* or three 
years prior to Utah's attempt to establish jurisdiction 
over Indian lands. 
The United States Supreme Court has had opportu-
nity to interpret section 1326. In Kennerlyy. District 
Court of Montana (1971), 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 
21 L.Ed,2d 507, the Court considered an assertion of juris 
diction b Montana over the Blackfoot reservation, which 
was construed to by the tribal council. The holding finds 
that the state had no jurisdiction over the rtnervation. 
"The unilateral action of the Tribal Council was insuffi-
cient to vest Montana with jurisdiction over Indian 
country...." C1^., at p.427.) Tribal consent must be 
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manifested by a majority vote of the enrolled Indians 
affected as prerequisite to any imposition of state 
authority :md jurisdiction, (Id ., at p.^29.) 
In the case of the Navajo Tr|bef no election has 
ever been held pursuant to 25 U*S.C. §1326. Thus, Utah 
Code sections 63-36-9 an'1 63-36-13 are meaningless and 
ineffective statutes, Utah cannot claiim to have acquired 
jurisdiction over the Navajo Reservation through compliance 
with the requirements of 25 U.S.C. g§l 3|21- J 326 , 
Tn<* holding in McClanahan dictates the result in 
this case* Utah is preempted from exer|c»sing jurisdiction 
over controversies arising upon the Navajo Reservation 
between members of that Tribe. Thus, Utah is without 
subject matter jurisdiction over this cdntrovercy. To 
hold otherwise would allow Utah to improperly extend its 
civil authority over the Navajo Reservation through 
enforcement of its Public Support of Children Act against 
a Navajo domiciliary of that Reservatio^. 
Even ii the lesser standard o^ sovereignty 
infringement is used to analyze this ca^e, Utah would 
nonetheless lack subject matter j urisdic|tion over the 
present controversy. The test developed! in Williams v. 
Ljeje, as noted above, is that Indian Trib|es retain the 
right to make their own laws and be governed by them. 
Spates cannot assert a right which underlines such Tribal 
rights. 
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The Navajo Tribe has created a tribal court for 
the purpose of hearing and resolving controversies between 
the Tribe's members, The^e are courts of genera] civ.ll 
jurisdiction which can hear cases such as the present 
action* The tribe has also established a comprehensive 
Tribal Code, and the present action could be brought under 
Title 7, section 253(2) of the Navajo Tribal Code and 
Title 9, section 401 et seq, of the Code . The Tribal 
Courts will enforce delinquent child support obligations. 
See, Lee v. Foster (1982), 3 Navajo Reporter 141. 
Appellant also notes that the general rule with 
regard to a divorce decree is that the rendering court 
retains continuing jurisdiction over such aspects of the 
decree as alimony, child custody and child support. S_ee, 
Flannery v. Flannery (19 75), Utah, 536 P.?d 136. The 
Courts of the Navajo Nation are no different in this 
regard, and parties to a divorce nay rely on the continuing 
jurisdiction of the rendering Tribal Court to modify or 
////// 
« _ _ _ .... . _ _ 
7 N.T.C. 253(2) states: The Trial Court of the Navajo Tribe shaJl 
have original jurisdiction over:....[a]ll civil actions in which the 
defendant is an Indian and is found within its territorial jurisdic-
tion. All civil actions in which the defendant is a resident of 
Navajo Indian Country, or has caused an action to occur in Navajo 
Indian Country. 
This title of the Code is entitled "Domestic Relations1' and states 
at section 404: Each divorce decree shall provide for a fair and just 
settlement of property rights between the parties, and also for the 
custody and proper care of the minor children. 
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enforce the terms of a decree. See, A|rv_i^ o v__u Dahozy 
(1982), 3 Navajo Reporter 84* Ihe continuing jurisdiction 
of the Tuba Cicy District Court over the child support 
award in tiie uecree of Divorce between appellant and 
Helen Vijil would allow either Mrs, Vijil or the Department 
(to when Mrs. Vijil's rights are subrogated) to call upon 
the Tuba City District Count to collect); arrearages of 
child support. 
The Navajo Tribe has chosen tto exercise its 
sovereign powe^ of self-government to 4 e cl& r e that its own 
courts shall have jurisdiction to determine controversies 
betv/een its own members involving child! support* When such 
a Tribal forum exists, it is exclusive (R.J, Williams Co. 
v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority (suprja) , 719 F.2d 979), 
and the assumption of jurisdiction by a| Utah court circum-
vents this exercise of sovereignty, undermining the 
authority of the Tribal courts and infringing upon the 
right of the Navajo Tifbe to make its o^n laws and be 
governed by them, A more specific infringement exists to 
the extent that ihe District Court's assumption of juris-
diction undermines the continuing jurisdiction of the Tuba 
City DiFtrlct Court over the divorce of appellant and Helen 
Vijil, witn the attendant risk of conflicting adjudications 
of the child support obligation. In orefer to preserve the 
Tribe's sovereignty, actions such as the( present one must 
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be brought in the Navajo Tribal Courts, 
The State of Utah lacks subject matter juris-
diction over this controversy either under the sovereignty 
infringement analysis of Wj11iams or the preemption 
analysis of McClanahan. As the District Court had no 
jurisdiction over the action, the default judgment 
rendered is invalid and must be vacated. The Writ of 
Garnishment baaed on the default judgment is also invalid 
and must be quashed, 
II. THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER A NAVAJO RESIDENT 
OF THE NAVAJO RESERVATION WHO HAS 
NO SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WITH UTAH, 
The logic of the holdings in Williams v» Lee, 
supia, McClanahan v» Arizona State Tax Commissioner, SJJpra, 
and Fisher v. District Court, supra, dictates that the mere 
physical presence of an Indian upon a reservation, located 
within the boundaries of a state, do^s not confer upon the 
state personal jurisdiction over that Indian. All exercises 
ci state civil jurisdiction, either personal or subject 
matter, must be gauged by the sane principles of pre-
emption and sovereignty infringement. A state has neither 
subject matter or personal jurisdiction over a controversy 
arising upon a reservation between members of an Indian 
tribe, regardless of the fact that ihe icseivation resi-
dence is nominally located within the state. 
The appellant believes that \this conclusion 
terminates the analysis of the present case, and the 
default judgment must be vacated fox bi>th absence of sub-
ject mattei and persona] jurisdiction \u the District 
Court. However* Judge Bunnell's Ruling suggest^ that 
Utah may ibtain subject matter ana pergonal jurisdiction 
over Daniel \ijil through the presence of his WJfe and 
children In Utah collecting AFDC benefits. This aiguiienc 
is untenable in the iace of the fact tfhat all the lights 
and liabiliticp oi the parties originate upon the Reserva-
tions m d that the power of the Department of Social 
Services devolves front these Reserva t ioik-based rights. 
Nonetheless, even undrr the f,si gnif icantf contacts" 
analysis, discusred in this section, Ut4h can assert no 
jurisdiction in this case. 
Ihe court in PjL_sher suggested in dicta that 
substantial off-reservation conduct migh|t create state-
court )* risdlction. 
"Since the adoption proceeding 
13 appropriate!} characterized as 
litigation arising on the Indian 
reservation, the jurisdiction of 
the Tribal Court is exclusive. 
The [defendants] nave not sought 
to defend the state court's juris-
diction by arguing that any sub-
stantial part of the condac1" 
supporting the adoption petition 
took place off the reservation." 
[Citations.]. 
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Fisher v. District Court, supra , 4 24 »T.S. at p. 389* This 
pilncifle hie never been given further development by th«i 
Court* The extreme end of the juiisdjctional spectrum is 
stated in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (19710 , 411 U.S. 
)4t>, 93 S.Cr. 1267, 3o L.Ed.2d 114* a vompanion case to 
McClanahan. The court declared 
H[a]bsent express federal law to 
the contrary, Indians going beyond 
reservation boundaries have generally 
been held subject to nondiscriminatory 
state law otherwise applicable to all 
citizens of the State.11 
(Id., at p.148-149) 
One may reasonably infer from these cases that 
under ciuunstinces where the basis of a contiovtrsy has 
substantul off-reservation components, the United States 
Supreme Court night permit ctate court luiisdiction ov^r a 
reservation domiciled Indian, Ilowwri, wnile courts at 
the federal level have acknowledged the existence of this 
rule f (R_» I
 s Will jams Co. y_. Fort Belknap Housing Authority 
(supra) , 719 F*?d at pp.984-98 r>)j and, by inter en ce, its 
validity, only state courts have done much to fill-in the 
details* of the analysis which the rule suggests. Conse-
quently, examination of these state court decisions is 
required to establish the mode ot analysis, 
*
l l
 State ex VJL 1 . F lanmond xt. Flaminond , supra , 
621 P.2d 471, after stating that Mortana was preempted 
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from asserting subject matter j urisd i c|t Lon over the 
controversy at issue, the Court noted |an exception to this 
rule where M...the transaction entails| 'significant* or 
'substantial' contacts with the state Outside of reserva-
tion boundaries.11 * }j) • * at p.472) XhfLs exception is 
supported by a series of Montana citations. 
Each of the cases cited bv ttie Flammond court 
have two factors in common: in each ca^e the deciding 
court first found that the state's assertion of jurisdic-
tion did not infringe upon the sovereignty of the tribal 
entity in question, aft^r which each co|urt turned to i 
determination of whether the controversy involves signifi-
cant and substantia] ofi-reservation contacts* (Crawiord 
v. Roy (1973), 176 Mont. 227, r> 7 7 P.2d i9? [Where a Black-
teet Indian, who is a state licensed attorney, dooiicled 
on-reservation, formed a contract off-reservation with 
non-Indians for on- and off- reservation^ services, suit 
on contract in state court is permitted |as there are 
significant ofi-reservatIon contacts and| no infringement 
of tribal sovereignty.]; Little Horn Sta|te Bank v. Stops 
(1976), 17Q Mont, 510, 5hb P.?d 211, cerfrr. dtn. Stops v. 
Little Horn State Bank (1977), 430 U.S. ^04, 97 S.Ct. 1171, 
51 L*Ed*2d !>30 [Where reservation Indian^ voluntarily 
incurred 1oan obligation outside reservation boundaries 
and there was no tribax court prorfdure Available for 
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levy on debt, state court "jurisdiction was valid based on 
olf-reservation contact and there is no infringement of 
tribal court system and tribal soveiei&vty.]; Bad Horse v. 
Bad Horse (1974), lb3 Mont. 445, hi 1 P.2d 693, cert, den, 
419 U.S. 847, 95 b.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed.2d 76 [Where reserva-
tion Indians married ofl-ieservatlon under authority of 
state licence, and tribal code provides that Ferriages 
and divorces roust be consummated in accordance with state 
law, there exists significant contacts and no infringement 
of tribal sovereignty* therefore state had jurisdiction 
over divorce j.) 
After mentioning these authorities, the F1 c'/amond 
court proceeded to weigh the contacts which the defendant 
in that case had with Montana. The Court fiist noted, as 
has appelJutit, that a reservation domicile is out an in-
stite contact, S_t a lje_ ejc r el * Flammond v » Flammond * supra » 
621 P,2d at p«473* Ihe Court then declared that the juris-
dictional assertion must be measured by the minimum contacts 
standard of International Shoe v. Washington ( 1 9 4 J ) , 3 2b 
U.S. 310, 316, 6n S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed, 95, and its 
progeny, so that ",.^maintenance of the buit does not 
offend * traditional notions of fair flay and substantial 
justice1. !l F2amr.ond (supra), at p.'*73. 'Hie flammond 
Court held 
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. . • the respondent fathejr has in-
jured neither persons nor property 
within the State of Montana. The 
cause of action to enforce support 
payments arises solely from his 
domestic relations. The controversy 
is the outgruwth of a separation 
that did not occur within Montana's 
territorial jurisdiction and that 
was not otherwise connected with 
this state....The District Court 
had no basis to assert personal 
jurisdiction over the respondent." 
(Ibid.) Having found no adequate contacts, the Court 
upheld the District Court dismissal without analyzing the 
possible infringement effect which stat^ court jurisdiction 
would have had. 
tf the present Court finds it (necessary to decide 
this case using the "substantial contacts'1 analysis, the 
first step will require an examination olf the weakening 
effect which a permitted exercine of sta|»e jurisdiction 
will have on the Navajo Courts and Navajct) sovereignty. As 
was discussed In Part i» clear grounds fc^ r infringement do 
exist given the jurisdiction of the Tribajl courts over 
controversies such as the present one, T|his conclusion 
should be enough to terminate this analysis. Even if it 
did not, no substantial contacts can be f^und in this case. 
After International Shoe, stated have delimited 
their exercise of long-arm jurisdiction b^sed upon signi-
ficant contacts either bv allowing any exercise of juris-
diction which is Constitutionally permissible (eg* Califor-
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nia), or by estabJishing a set list of sufficient contacts 
outside which no jurisdictional exercise is allowed (eg, 
Utah)* If thib Court were to validate jurisdiction over 
reservation Indians on any available Constitutional grounds, 
jurisdiction La this case would be denied, 
I n
 Hanson v. Denkla f 1958) , 357 U.S. 235, 78 
S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, the Supreme Court declared 
n[tjhe unilateral activity of those 
who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy 
the requirement of contact with the 
forum State. . . . [I]t is essential in 
each case that there be some act by 
which the defendant purposefully 
avails [him]self of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the 
forum State. . . . " 
(Jjd. , at p.253.) This policy was later expanded in the 
domestic relations case of Kulko v. California Superior 
Court (1978), 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.EU.2d 132, 
reh. den. 438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150. 
There, the unilateral actions of a woman separated from her 
husband in New York, moving to California, sending for her 
children in New York, and applying to the California courts 
for an increase in child support, were Insufficient grounds 
for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the husband, 
a New York resident with no other contacts in California. 
The Court held, inter alia, that the defendant had not done 
any act to purposely avail himself of the benefits and 
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protections oi California laws (Tjd. » djt p.94) ana that 
basic considerations of fairness requilred an adjudication 
ot the claim In New York, as the husbahd had maintained 
this place tf domicile, where the obligation which was 
the basis of the controversy arose* ancjl the wife had moved 
away. (£<!•* a t p-9/-) 
Ihe present ease is analogous to Ku Lk o • Daniel 
and Helen Vijil were married on the Navlajc Reservation, had 
their children tlnre, and were divoicedi by the Navajo Tribal 
courts* Daniel Vijil lias since maintained hib Reservation 
domicile, vyrbile it was Helen's voluntary choice to move off 
the resetvation, take her children and Ripply for AfDC 
Deaetits rather than pursue her support rights in the 
Navajo Tribal coutts. Consequentlv, Daniel Viirl hao done 
nothing to avail hnrself of the benefitsl and protections 
of the laws of Utah, and fairnets requires ad j udicat i on 
oi this claim m the Navajo Tribal rourtL. 
It would probably be improper for the present 
court even to reach this stage in its analysis. As stated, 
Utah has seen rit to limit the bases ror assertion of 
long-arm jurisdiction in Utah Lode Annotated &ection 
7 8-27-24. This statute states, in its enltirety, 
Any person, notwithstanding section 
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any or the follow-
ing enumerated acts, submit^ himself, 
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and ii an individual, his pejsonal 
representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as tt 
any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business 
within this state; 
(2) Contracting to suppJ> services 
or goods in this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury with-
in this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty; 
CO Ihe ownership, use, or possession 
of any real estate situated in this state; 
(3) Contracting to insure any person, 
property or risk located within this state 
ai the time of contracting; 
(b) With respect to actions of divorce 
and separate maintenance, the maintenance 
in this state of a matrimonial domicile at 
the time the claim arose or the commission 
in this state of the act givmf rise to the 
claim, or 
(7) The commission of sexual intercourse 
within this state which gives rise to a 
paternity suit under Chapter 4 3a, Title 78, 
to determine paternity for the purpose of 
estabLishing responsibility for child 
support. 
The enumerated acts aie the oulv ones which Utah couits 
are authorized to ccnsider in an assertion of non-resident 
Daniel Vi j i1 has not engaged ±n any of the icts 
lifted in section 78-27-24. Neither subsection Six nor 
subsection Jeven applies to an art Ion under the Public 
Enforcement of Support Act (Title 7Q» Chapter 45b), 
Consequently, I tdh has no ba^is upon which to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over Daniel V i j L1 „ 
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This Court mubt therefore conclude thai the 
District Court had no jurisdiction ov^r the person of 
Daniel Vijil. Contrary lo the assertions oi the District-
Courts the presence ot Helen Vijil an4 her children in 
Utah is not a contact sufficient to establish jurisdiction 
over Mr. Vijil. If the "significant c|ontactsft analysis is 
applied (which appellant agains emphasizes is not neces-
sary ai the only legitimate rights at Issue arc those of 
reservation Indians, while those of th^ Respondent are 
derivatives mandating a dismissal of tills case under the 
preemption analysis discussed in Part I}) the Court must 
weigh infringement and significant contacts. Assertion 
of jurisdiction by Utah does infringe upon the sovereignty 
of the Navajo courts and Tribe, and Mrsj. Vijil's acts are 
not adequate to vest Utah with jurisdiction cither under 
the Utah Code or general Constitutional (principles. The 
District Court lacked jurisdiction over the person of 
Daniel Vifii and the judgment must te valcatod, and the 
writ of garnishment quashed, on these grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
Two independent legal grounds have been raised, 
each warranting that the default -judgment} in this wsse be 
vacated and the writ of garnishment quashjed: lack of 
personai jurisdiction over Daniel Vijil ajnd lack of subject 
////// -31-
natter of jurisdiction over the controversy. Under 
federal law a state may not assert civil authority over 
a controversy arising within Indian territory between 
Indians if relevant treaties and statutes preempt the 
exercise of that authority* In this case, altlough 
the Department of becial Services is the plaintiff, its 
powers to pursue this action are derived 1 rop an Indian's 
reservation-based right of support, and preemption 
analysis is appropriately employed here* The Treaty of 
1868 between the Navajos and the United States, the Utah 
Enabling Act, and 25 U-S*C. §§1321-1326 preclude the 
assertion ot Utah's civil inthority over the Navajo 
Reservation. Thus, Utah is preempted from claiming 
subject matter jurisdiction in this controversy and the 
default judgment must be vacated on these grounds. 
Alternatively, federal law may test: the limits 
of a state's civil authority over Indian controversies 
throufh a sovereignty infringement approach, ^/hich examines 
the corrosive effect an assertion of state jurisdiction 
will have on tribal laws and institutions. Generally, once 
a court finds that preemption analysis is appropriately 
employed and the state's auihotity p reeiup L c d , no infringe-
ment analysis it> done. However, ia the pies^nt case, the 
Navijo Tribe ha^ proxided a forum for the adjudication of 
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controversies such as the one examined here, and jf this 
method of analysis is used, this Coijrt would be obliged 
to hold that the District Court1s assertion of jurisdiction 
undermines the authority of the&e Na|vajo Courts. Utah's 
civ^l authority is precluded, and thb default judgment 
must be vacated, 
Utah also lackb jurisdiction over the person of 
Daniel VJMil. Federal law prohibits the extension of any 
civit jurisdiction by Utah to Navajo lands and people. 
This rule applies equally to subjtet batter and personal 
jurisdiction. Mr. Vijii's presence oh that portion of 
the Navajo Reservation located within Utah is not an in-
state contict sufficient to grant jurisdiction over his 
person. 
The same result is reached ilf the "significant 
contacts11 theory of some state courts, particularly Montana, 
is employed. Under this rule either tlhe infringement 
effect of state jurisdiction or the absence of significant 
contacts will defeat jurisdiction. As stated, there is 
infringement if the District Court adjudicates a case pro-
perly brought in the Navajo Courts. The only contact 
which Mr. Vijil has with the rtatt is hjis wife and children's 
presence in Utah off the reservation. jUnder either tradi-
tional Constitutional principles ot minlimum contacts or the 
Utah long-am statute, this "contict-" i|=5 inadequate to 
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create jurisdiction over the person of Daniel Vijil. 
Consequently, the District Court lacked in 
personem jurisdiction over Daniel Vijil, invalidating the 
default judgment entered against him. This judgment must 
be vacated, and the writ of garnishment which it supports 
must be quashed. 
Dat ^ v^^^miy^ 
Stevtn Boos( 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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